Separation of Powers, Line Item Veto and the Tax Level: Evidence from the American States Draft 1 by Lucas Ferrero & Leandro M. de Magalhães
Separation of Powers, Line Item Veto and the
Tax Level: Evidence from the American States
Draft 1
Lucas Ferrero and Leandro M. de Magalh˜ aes∗
October 2005
Abstract
Line item veto, a feature present in most American States, gives the
governor the power to veto single appropriation items from the budget.
Its eﬀects on the tax level, however, are still controversial in the empirical
and theoretical literature (cf. Holtz-Eakins (1988) and Besley and Case
(2003)). Line item veto is mostly a time invariant feature and to asses its
eﬀects previous studies have interacted it with political control variables
such as a divided government. The endogenity problems that arise from
using a political variable to explain a policy variable, however, have not
been dealt with in these studies. We use three empirical approaches to
tackle the problem and show that line item veto does have a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on the tax rate in the States: diﬀs-in-diﬀs estimation with
instrumental variables (election results in lower oﬃces at the state level),
regression discontinuity design, and a dynamic panel. Our prior on its
eﬀects comes from adapting the separation of powers model by Persson,
Roland and Tabellini (2000) to the American States setup: we add line
item veto and an executive. Our model delivers a clear prediction on the




Line item veto is mostly seen as a tool to cut down the pork and trim the
budget. Most states have had this feature since the end of the 19th century. It
was recently adopted by Maine in 1995 and North Carolina in 1997, bringing the
total number of States with line item veto to 45. At the Federal level its adoption
has been controversial. Many Presidents urged Congress to give this power to
them. During the Reagan and Bush years, a Democrat controlled Congress
refused to yield. When Republicans became the majority under Clinton they
approved it, only to see it judged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in a
6-3 decision. To this day the President can only block veto the budget proposed
by Congress1.
Many other institutional features aimed at limiting the size of the budget
and the tax rate have been adopted across states. In the seventies tax and
expenditure limitations were introduced by many. Recently, supermajority re-
quirements to raise taxes have been adopted by some2. Moreover, all states
except Vermont have some form of balanced budget requirement and no-carry-
over deﬁcit rules. All these rules have been adopted with the electorate hoping
to keep taxes down and expenditures under control3. A large empirical and
theoretical literature has study these institutions and their eﬀects on state’s ﬁ-
nances, theoretically and empirically. A comprehensive review is found in Besley
and Case (2003)[7].
The part of the literature that has dealt with line item veto has not been
conclusive either in their theoretical predictions nor in their empirical results.
This is the question we address in this paper. Is line item veto actually eﬃcient
in keeping the tax level down?
Burton Abrams and William Dougan (1986)[1] based solely on a cross-section
ﬁnd no eﬀect of line item veto on the tax level. Bohn and Inman (1996)[8] work
with a panel on 47 states from 1970 to 1991. Since line item veto is time
invariant, they regress the ﬁxed eﬀects on the institutional features. They ﬁnd
1For a more detailed account of the Supreme Court ruling see Urofsky and Finkelman
(2002)[22]
2Brian Knight(2000)[13] has found a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on supermajority require-
ments on the tax level controlling for the endogeneity arising from self selection into treatment.
3Here we follow most of the literature and take the presence of line item veto in a State as
exogenous. De Figueiredo (2002)[10] looks into the reasons of adopting line item veto in the
ﬁrst place.
2that states with line item veto and no-deﬁcit rules have lower deﬁcits. Closer
to our work, Holtz-Eakins (1988)[12] studies a panel from 1966 to 1983. He
runs a ﬁxed eﬀect model interacting the time invariant line item veto with
partisan variables that indicate diﬀerent levels of control of state institutions.
He ﬁnds a negative impact on spending but a positive impact on the overall
taxation. This is not seen as unexpected by Holtz-Eakins (1988). He had no
prior on the direction the line item veto would aﬀect the tax level. In his model
the governor represents the preferences of the median voter in the state and
the chambers represent the preferences of the median legislator. Line item veto
brings the outcome closer to the governor’s preferred point. Since the governor’s
preferred point is unknown, the direction of the line item veto eﬀect on tax and
expenditure is not predicted.
The most recent empirical work to our knowledge on the eﬀects of line item
veto is Besley and Case (2003)[7]. They present no model but argue that the
line item veto should improve the bargaining power of the governor. They
have a longer data set and interact line item veto with a dummy for divided
government. In their estimates a divided government in a state with line item
veto has a negative eﬀect on the tax level. The use of political variables (divided
versus aligned government) to explain the tax rate, however, presents serious
endogeneity problems.
Implicitly, a divided government in a State with line item veto is considered
to be the ‘treated’ group, and the control group are the states with an aligned
government or those without line item veto all together. For this approach to
be consistent, assignment to ‘treatment’ must be random. This is not the case
since assignment is the result of an election. Omitted variables and reverse
causation are issues to be considered4. Moreover, serially correlate outcomes,
which are common in the diﬀs-in-diﬀs literature, may result in inconsistent
standards errors5. These potential problems are not accounted for, however, in
the above exercises. The main contribution of this paper is to deal with these
endogenity problems and show that line item veto does have a negative eﬀect
on the tax rate when interacted with a divided government. We use a panel
of 47 states in the last 40 years. First we present a diﬀ-in-diﬀs estimate and
4For a thorough discussion of these endogeneity issues in the context of diﬀ-in-diﬀ, see
Besley and Case(2000)[6].
5Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan (2004) study this problems with simulations in a diﬀ-
in-diﬀs context.
3instrument for our political variable with election results of oﬃces other than
the House or Senate. We then restrict our sample to the observations around
the line that separates a minority government from a fully aligned government,
this is the research discontinuity design approach. Lastly we let the tax level be
lagged and estimate a dynamic panel using election results for non legislative
oﬃces in the states as an additional instrument for divided government. All
over, to take into account the serial correlated nature of outcome variable, the
tax rate, we use clustered errors by state as advised in Bertrand, Duﬂo and
Mullainathan (2004)[4].
Before going through the details of our estimation strategies in Section 3
we develop a model in the next section to understand the actual institutional
mechanism that delivers a low tax level. We call the relevant institutional
feature ﬁnancial separation of powers, and it is achieved when the power with
the prerogative to raise taxes is not the residual claimant of a tax increase. As we
shall see, not all regimes that present separation of powers, as most presidential
regimes do, present ﬁnancial separation. The model is an adaptation to the
American States case of the separation of powers model in Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (2000)[16], henceforth PRT. Our model delivers a clear prediction on
the tax level, on the amount of public good, and on the importance of group
speciﬁc transfers. Line item veto works in keeping taxes low because it allows a
minority governor to prevent the opposition controlled chambers, which control
both taxation and allocation, from being the residual claimant of a tax increase.
2 Financial Separation of Powers in the States
In the American States, by constitutional or statutory requirements, the power
to initiate tax increasing bills and to approve the budget lies with both cham-
bers. Even if the budget is written by the governor or by independent agencies,
it can be amended and rewritten at will once it reaches the House and Senate6.
The chambers have all the agenda setting power, they propose a tax rate and
how to allocate revenues. Stringent deﬁcit carry-over rules imply that deﬁcit
is not a ﬁnancial option in the States, it is mostly due to unexpected events
and must be zeroed in the following budget. The governor’s powers are mostly
reactive; depending on the particular State she may veto individual items or
6For detail information on states budget procedures see [15]NCSL website.
4block veto the whole budget. The chambers may override the veto by super-
majority7. Other budgetary powers are related to the implementation stage,
specially regarding unforseen revenues or shortfalls, but we assume them away
here for simplicity.
The model assumes that revenues come from a state wide individual lump
sum tax. Expenditures cannot be ﬁnanced by deﬁcit. The resources are used to
pay for the politicians rents, a public good, and group speciﬁc transfers. Here we
think of groups as Democrats, Moderates or Independents, and Republicans8.
All three groups receive equal utility from the public good, but they only care
for their own non-transferable group speciﬁc transfer. Voters set reservation
utilities once they learn the role their representative plays. If they are met they
reelect their politicians. A separately elected governor may then veto single
items in the allocation proposal if the state allows for line item veto, or only
block veto the budget otherwise. Line item veto will deliver ﬁnancial separation
if the governor and the representative who controls the agenda in the chambers
are not from the same group.
We focus on three cases. The ﬁrst we call a Simple Legislature: it represents
the case of an aligned government. Both the legislative agenda and the executive
are controlled by the same group-party. Since the powers are completely aligned,
line item veto or block veto do not play any role. We abstract from the executive
and give the result as presented in PRT, a congress with three legislators, one of
which is assigned the agenda setting power. We then add an separately elected
executive with block veto, and show the result does not change. Finally we
present the case with line item veto and the outcomes it implies.
2.1 Set-up
There are three groups of voters (or electoral districts) i = 1,2,3 of size (mass)






7Five States have a simple majority requirement to override a line item veto: Alabama,
Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee.
8The third group is essential to our argument. Even though a polarization between the
two parties is fact in American politics as seen in Poole and Rosenthal (1984)[18]
5where δ is a discount factor and qt is a vector of policies qt = [τt,gt,fi
t,rl
t].
The policy vector consists in τ, a percapita lump sum tax; fi, a group speciﬁc
transfer to group i; g, a public good; and rl, the rents to each politician. The
utility function in each period for a group i is given by:
bi = ci + H(g) = y − τ + fi + H(g),
where H(·) is a concave and monotonically increasing function. We also assume:
Hg(0) > 1. All policy variables are constrained to be nonnegative. Individual
income y is normalized to 1.









t is one if in oﬃce in period t and zero otherwise and V l(qt) = rl
t.
When choosing policy, politicians face the following government budget con-
straint:




rl = g + f + r.
What would a benevolent central planner do? She would maximize the sum of
voters utilities by setting rents to zero, choose g optimally: H−1
g (1
3), and share
transfers equally. If taxation were somewhat distortionary, transfers would be
set to zero. Taxes would be just high enough to pay for that.
2.2 Simple Legislature
Now, let us consider the following legislative game. Three incumbent politicians
are in oﬃce. They set policy, and then they face re-election. Each politician is
elected in a single member district under plurality rule. Districts coincide with
the groups described above; thus, each group decides whether or not to re-elect
one of the politicians. Voters in each group i choose a backward looking strategy
taking the form: I vote for the incumbent politician running for re-election in
my district if my utility is above a given threshold ωi, which depends on the
role my representative plays. Voters coordinate their votes within district but
6not across district.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Nature chooses L as the only legislator with proposal power9.
2. Voters set their reservation utilities, ωi, contemporaneously to the the
other groups and taking into account the subsequent stages of the game.
3. L makes a proposal for the allocation of resources : [g;rL,r2,r3;fL,f2,f3]
and a tax level, τL.
4. The Legislature votes. If two politicians vote ‘Yes’, L’s proposal is imple-
mented. If two vote ‘No’, a status quo is implemented. The status quo
consists of an exogenously given r to each politician: 0 < r = τ < 1; and
of g = fi = 0.
5. Elections are held.
Since we are only reproducing the results in PRT [16] the equilibrium con-
cept is the same.
An equilibrium of the simple legislature is a vector of policies qL
t (bt) and a
vector of reservation utilities bL
t , such that, in any period t, when all players
take as given the equilibrium outcomes of periods t + k,k ≥ 1:
1. for any given bt at least one legislator i 6= L weakly prefers qL
t (bt) to the
default outcome;
2. for any give bL
t , the agenda-setting legislator L prefers qL
t (bt) to any other
policy satisfying the condition above
3. the reservation utilities biL
t are optimal for the voters in each district i
when one takes into account that policies in the current period are set
according to qL
t (bt), takes as given the reservation utilities in the other
regions b
−iL
t and the identity of the agenda setter.
PROPOSITION: There is a unique stationary equilibrium that satisﬁes these
conditions:
τL = 1;
9To simplify exposition let’s assume without loss of generality it is legislator 1.
7rL = 3 − δW − r, rj = r − δW, r−j = 0 for j = 2,3;
g∗ = min[H−1
g (1),2δW];
fL = 2δW − g∗, fj = 0 for j 6= L;
ωL = H(g∗) + fL, ω2 = ω3 = H(g∗);
and all politicians are reelected.
W is the continuation value of being in oﬃce. In the case of a simple legis-
lature, at each period one of the politicians has probability one-third of being











Let us go through the intuition of the proof of the above proposition10. The rents
politicians receive in equilibrium must make them indiﬀerent between running
away with everything and being reelected. Suppose politicians run away, the
agenda-setter L sets τ = 1 and grabs 3τ − r. She must pay another politician
to accept her proposal, hence the r. In equilibrium politicians are reelected.
They get a positive continuation value W in the next period. Voters allow the
agenda-setter to appropriate rL = 3−δW −r while paying r−δW to a coalition
partner.
Voters add the rents for politicians as a constraint in their maximization
problem. Voters in group L maximize knowing their representative is the
agenda-setter. They ask for positive group speciﬁc transfers since they do not
internalize the full cost of taxation, which is spread equally among groups. The
level of the public good, g, is chosen in the point where the marginal beneﬁt from
g equals the marginal beneﬁt from the transfers, fL, that is, at g = H−1
g (1).
This implies there is underprovision of the public good. Transfers to the other
groups are zero because voters play a Bertrand game when trying to be in-
cluded in the minimum winning coalition. They underbid each other oﬀering
lower transfers.
Taxes are maximum because both the voters in group L and legislator L
himself are able to allocate any extra dollar of resources to either rents for leg-
islator L or transfers to group L. Since only one third of the costs of taxation
are born by voters in group L, but they receive all the marginal beneﬁt with
10For a detailed proof see PRT[16]
8transfers, they are willing to maximize the tax level. Both the voters in group L
and legislator L are the residual claimants of a tax increase. They dispute only
wether it should go to transfers or to rents. The underlining assumption on the
governor’s role is that, when powers are aligned, it is as if both the executive and
the legislative belonged to politician L. There is complete alignment between
the interests of the legislator and the executive of the same party. There is no
ﬁnancial separation when powers are aligned.
2.3 Block Veto
Out of the 50 states, 7 do not allow their governors to cut single items from the
budget11, but they do allow their governors to veto the budget as a whole. The
economic outcomes are the same as in the Simple Legislature.
We add a governor to the above model in the simplest way possible12. For
any given election, each voter casts a vote to their legislator and to governor.
There are 3 candidates to the executive oﬃce, one from each group. Voters treat
the governor as the other politicians, if their reservation utilities are met, they
reelect their legislator in their district and recast their vote for governor to their
own group candidate. To simplify analysis we let Nature choose the winner of
a three way race for the executive oﬃce13. A governor then, is not reelected
for sure if the reservation utilities are met, but he is not denied the chance to
run for a second term. The candidates that run and loose get a chance to run
11Indiana, Maine, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
12An interesting empirical exercise for the PRT model without the adding of a governor
is found in the ﬁnancial committees in the American States parliaments. Crain and Muris
(1995)[9] classify and argue that states where there is a clear distinction between revenue and
spending committees have lower taxation. They test their hypothesis with a cross-section. We
were, however, unable to reproduce their classiﬁcation regarding the role of each committee
over taxation and allocation.
13We stand by these simplifying hypothesis since we are interested in the mechanism that
delivers low taxation once a government is in power. Even though the reelection of politicians
is an equilibrium outcome, we simplify the election results by letting Nature assign the role of
agenda setter and governor. Allowing voters to decide between divided and aligned governors
would be interesting, but would move the focus away from the ﬁnancial separation results. For
a discussion on the endogeneity of divided government see Alesina and Rosenthal (1996)[2]
and for the understanding of divided government in the United States at the federal and state
level see Fiorina(1996)[11]. At the empirical estimation we take this endogenity problems into
account.
9again. Formally, we are just adding a politician to the model. The vector of
proposal has to include the rents of the governor, rE. If the governor chooses
to veto the approved budget the status quo is implemented: r = rl for every
legislator l and for the governor; g = fi = 0 for the citizens. We assume away
for simplicity the possibility of an override, but it would not change the results.
The cost of this new politician has to be included in the constraint of the voters
maximization. Apart from these adjustments the equilibrium does not change.
PROPOSTION 1: In the unique equilibrium only group L receives positive
transfers.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which the voters in group E, the
group of voters the governor responds to, set their reservation utilities asking
for positive transfers. To proof the proposition it suﬃces to show that it is an
optimal deviation to voters in group L to ask for all transfers to themselves
as in the Simple Legislature case. With this deviation, the optimal proposal
by legislator L is to deliver her voters reservation utilities with zero transfers
to group E, fE = 0. The proposal is approved by the third legislator, whose
constituency underbids group E asking for less transfers. Neither the governor
E nor the the legislator that belongs to the governor’s party, call her G, will be
reelected. The governor still receives r not to veto the proposal, she will always
accept it because at that stage her reservation utility is the status quo outcome.
The case in which the governor and the agenda power all belong to the same
party, L=G, is the one dealt with in the Simple Legislature. The case where the
third group asks for positive transfers is discarded by the Bertrand competition
the voters go through to be included in the minwin coalition.QED.
Since only group L receives positive transfers, they ask for taxes to be set
at the maximum: τ = 1 and the public good to be set as before at g = H−1
g (1).
With block veto nothing changes, taxes are still high, only one group receives
positive transfers and the public good is underprovided. This is no longer true
if we allow the governor to veto single items of a budget proposal.
2.4 Line Item Veto
Within the model, line item veto is deﬁned as the power to eliminate or reduce
speciﬁc group transfers, fi or the public good, g. Any funds from the cuts go
10towards lower taxation. We do not allow rents to be vetoed as individual items,
but the governor may still block veto the proposal back to the status quo, where
f = g = 0 and r = r for every politician. One may think of rents as oﬀ-budget
items. The more important assumption is that the funds from the cut cannot
be allocated to any other purposes. If the governor had any proactive powers,
for example, to redirect funds from certain items to group speciﬁc transfers, the
results would change.
The timing of the game is given by:
1. Nature chooses L among the legislator to make a tax and an allocation
proposal and E among the candidates to be the governor and veto the
proposal. By assumption L and E are from diﬀerent parties. We call G
the legislator from the same party as the governor.
2. Voters set their reservation utilities according to the role their represen-
tatives play.
3. L makes a proposal τL and [g;rL,rG,r3,rE;fL,fE,f3] .
4. Congress votes both the tax and the allocation proposal together. If two
politicians vote ‘Yes’, L’s proposal is implemented. If two vote ‘No’, a
status quo is implemented. The status quo consists of g = fi = 0 and of
an exogenously given r = τ to each politician, 0 < r < 1.
5. E may choose to veto the approved proposal by cutting items.
6. Elections are held.
An equilibrium of the Line Item Veto regime is a vector of policies qV
t (bt)
and a vector of reservation utilities bV
t , such that, in any period t, when all
players take as given the equilibrium outcomes of periods t + k,k ≥ 1:
1. for any given bt, at the veto stage, the line item veto legislator E prefers
qV
t (bt) to any other policy vector pV
t (bt) approved by Congress in which
fV
t (bt) or gV
t (bt) is greater or equal than in qV
t (bt);
2. for any given bt, at stage 4, at least one legislator i 6= L weakly prefers
qV
t (pV
t (bt)) to the default outcome;
113. for any give bV
t , the agenda-setting legislator L prefers qV
t (pV
t (bt)) to any
other policy satisfying the conditions above;
4. the reservation utilities biV
t are optimal for the voters in each district
i, when one takes into account that policies in the current period are set
according to qV
t (bt) and takes as given the reservation utilities in the other
regions b
−iL
t and the identity of the agenda setter and of the governor.
PROPOSITION 2: There is a unique stationary equilibrium:
τ∗ = g∗ + r∗ ≤ 1;
fE = fL = f3 = 0;






ωi = H(g∗), for all i;
all legislators are re-elected and all candidates for governor run again14.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, let’s determine the outside option for politicians. If politicians decide to
forego reelection, the optimal deviation is for L to set τ = 1 and grab 3 − 2r.
She has to pay r to one of the other two politicians an to the governor not to
have the proposal vetoed.
In equilibrium politicians do not run away and, hence, receive δW, or δZ if
you are one of the candidates for governor. These represent the continuation
value of being in oﬃce. They will be determined in equilibrium. Therefore,
voters allow politicians to appropriate:
rL = 3 − 2r − δW − δZ;
rl = r − δW, rE = r − δZ.
The budget constraint facing the voters becomes:
g + f + 3 − 2δW − 2δZ ≤ 3τ.
14W and Z are the continuation values of being in oﬃce for the legislator and the continu-
ation value of running for governor for the politicians. They are determined in equilibrium.
12LEMMA 1. There are zero transfers in equilibrium.
proof. In any equilibrium foreseeing positive transfers to group 3, it would be an
optimal deviation of voters in group E to set their reservation utilities in such
a away that the transfer to group 3 are vetoed. This would increase E voters
welfare by decreasing taxes.
If there were positive transfers to group E, group 3 would underbid the oﬀer
and be part of the minwin coalition. L would allocate zero transfers to group
E. Governor E is sure not to be reelected and is paid r not to veto the proposal.
As in the Simple Legislature case the Bertrand competition takes care of any
positive transfers to a group other than group L.
For the case of positive transfers to group L we need the extra assumption
that g∗ < δ(W + Z). It guarantees uniqueness and it means that the optimal
level of public good in one period has to be less than the discounted continuation
value of being in oﬃce for the politicians15.
When group L is asking for positive transfers and the assumption above
holds, it is optimal for voters in group E to deviate and ask for zero transfers
to group L. L can not meet her voters reservation utility, she sets τ = 1 and
faces two options when running away: if she doesn’t deliver any public goods,
no politician will be reelected an hence they cost r each (the status quo would
kick in with f = g = 0); if she delivers g∗, they cost r − δW each and r − δZ
for the governor . Hence, for it to be optimal for L to run away delivering g∗ it
must be that:
3 − g∗ − (2r − δW − δZ) > 3 − 2r → g∗ < δW + δZ.
If this is the case, group E deviates and asks for transfers to group L to be
vetoed. QED.
Since there are no transfers, all voters have the same problem to maximize:
max H(g) − τ
s.t. g ≤ 3(1 − τ) + 2δ(W + Z).
which yields:




),3(1 − τ) + 2δ(W + Z)].
15A similar condition is necessary in PRT to maintain the uniqueness of their equilibrium
in the Coalition-Presidentialism case: g∗ < δW.
13Note the interesting result that the ﬁrst best level of public goods is achieved.
This was not the case in the separation of powers case in PRT. The presence of
line item veto and the sequential nature of the game allow for no transfers in
equilibrium. Voters can ask for the ﬁrst best level.
LEMMA 2. τ∗ ≤ 1.16
proof. Voters in group L, given the above result, wish to set just enough taxes
so as to pay for g∗ and for the price to keep politicians from running away:
3τ = g∗ + 3 − 2δ(W + Z).
The maximum tax level will be reached when g∗ = 3(1 − τ) + 2δ(W + Z). In
this case τ = 1. Hence: τ∗ ≤ 1.QED.
The continuation value of being in oﬃce depends on the probability of being
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The main intuition about this result is that at the veto stage the gover-
nor only cares to reach the reservation utilities of her constituency by cutting
transfers to other groups. Moreover, Betrand competition between group E and
group 3 guarantees L will not assign positive transfers to group E. Taking this
into account it is optimal for voters to ask for the ﬁrst best level of public goods.
16If we assume that y is big enough so that there is always enough taxable income to pay
for the optimal level of g, for the rents and for positive transfers, the inequality in Lemma 2
holds strictly.
14Taxes should be just high enough to pay for g∗ and for the politician’s rents.
2.5 Comments on Separation of Powers and Financial Sep-
aration
The deﬁnition of Presidentialism and the concept of separation of powers are
strictly linked. Presidentialism is usually deﬁned with the presence of an inde-
pendently elected executive which does not depend on a vote of conﬁdence by
the parliament17. By these deﬁnitions, the American States qualify as presi-
dential regimes, there is separation of powers. Financial separation of powers
as we have deﬁned here, however, is only present in the States with line item
veto when a divided government is in place. Only when ﬁnancial separation is
present should we expect a low tax level in presidential regimes18.
We built our model based on Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000)[16]. They
diﬀerentiate between a parliamentary regime, in which there is no separation of
powers and behaves much like the Simple Legislature case with high taxes and
positive transfers, and a coalitional-presidential regime. In the latter, one legis-
lator has power over taxation and another over allocation. Financial separation
is present because the legislator who has power over taxation is not the residual
claimant of the tax increase; taxes are low. From this result they predict that
presidential regimes should present lower tax levels than parliamentary regimes.
As we have just shown, the mechanism that delivers a low tax level is ﬁ-
nancial separation of power and it may not be present in presidential regimes
such as the American States. The Federal government itself does not present
ﬁnancial separation since the President only has block veto over the budget.
In the Latin America presidential regimes, for example, most executives may
initiate tax increasing bills, write the budget bill, have decree power, and even
veto rights with amendment powers19. It is no surprise that in an empirical
17These features are shared in the deﬁnitions by Lijphart(1999)[14] in ‘Patterns of Democ-
racy’ and by Shugart and Carey (1992) [19] in ‘Presidents and Assemblies’. Lijphart also
requires a one person executive, and Shugart and Carey include in the deﬁnition some law
making power to the executive.
18We have not investigate wether a parliamentary regime may also present ﬁnancial sepa-
ration. The degree of political independence of the ﬁnance minister may be a good indicator.
19In [21] we see that 10 Latin American countries have the power to propose amendments
when vetoing the budget.
15study by Persson and Tabellini looking for the eﬀects of presidentialism on the
tax level, ‘The Economic Eﬀects of Constitutions’(2003)[17], the IV result on a
panel of countries depended on the exclusion of a Latin America dummy.
The deﬁnitions of presidential and parliamentary regimes in the political sci-
ence literature are based on the mechanisms that determine how the executive
is brought to power or is ousted, either by the end of a predetermined man-
date or by a government crisis and a vote of no conﬁdence. When comparing
regimes using this classiﬁcation the object of study is mostly duration, stabil-
ity, or representativeness of the electorate. If the objects of study are policy
outcomes within a government that is in place, however, other classiﬁcations
are more relevant. One example is the number of veto players as described in
Tsebelis(2002)[20]:‘Veto Players, How Political Institutions Work’. The object
of study in this case is change in status quo policies. For there to be change,
agents with veto power must agree, these are called veto players. The number of
veto players in each regime and the order in which they act allow us to identify
the range o possible departures from the status quo. These two characteristics
are given by the constitutional features of a regime20. The model presented in
our paper can be read as trying to classify the American States according to the
numbers of veto players. In a state with line item veto, when the powers are not
aligned, there are two or three veto players and the status quo should be hard
to change (raise taxes). When all chambers and the governorship are aligned
we only have one veto player and expect more changes (complete redirection of
transfers for example).
In the case of the tax level, what matters is ﬁnancial separation, that is, the
power with the prerogative to raise taxes should not be the residual claimant of
the tax increase. And these are the constitutional features one should look for
in a country or state in order to make predictions on the tax level.
20Tsebelis (2002)[20] pg. 5 notes that the USA and Italy, who do not share any of the
usual characteristics used to classify regimes, are together when classiﬁed by the number of
veto players. They have a high number of veto players, which implies high policy stability
as opposed to countries such as Britain or Greece with only one veto player and, therefore,
prone to big policy changes.
163 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
We use a sample of 48 US states for the period 1960-9821. Most political, ﬁscal
and control variables are the same as in Besley and Case (2003)[7]22. The instru-
ments we use come from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002)[3]. Some institutional
and procedural variables, instead, have been collected from the National Asso-
ciation of State Budget Oﬃces (NASBO) and the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL). We also conducted three informal e-mail surveys directed
to state budget oﬃcers and legislature public oﬃcials to clarify ambiguous in-
formation and a few inconsistencies in the data.
The outcome variable we are interested in explaining is the tax level. The
measure we use is the average tax rate deﬁned as the sum of state sales, cor-
porate and income taxes over state income. Socio-economic controls such as
state population, state income in 1982 dollars, proportion of aged (over 65) and
kids (5 to 17) in the state will always be included in the regressions. Additional
institutional controls will be added: a dummy for the presence of a superma-
jority requirement to increase taxes, another for the presence of restrictive tax
limitations, one for a democrat governor and one for a independent governor.
Another two controls, percentage of the population that is black and the amount
of federal grants may be added at the cost of loosing some observations.
Our empirical strategy is borrowed from the empirical micro literature devel-
oped to estimate the eﬀect of various treatments. In our estimation the treated
will be the states with line item veto (a dummy taking value 1 if line item veto
is present and zero otherwise) interacted with a divided government (a dummy
taking value 1 if the government is divided and zero otherwise). The identiﬁca-
tion comes from comparing our treated with themselves in periods in which the
government was aligned, with other states with line item veto and an aligned
government at that period, and with the states without line item veto. We
always control for state and year ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to the socio-economic
and institutional controls we mentioned above.
We can visualize out treatment areas with Figures 1 and 2. On the y-axis
we have the percentage of members in the upper house that are from the same
21There isn’t enough data to include Alaska and Hawai.
22We thank Tim Besley for making the data set available to us.
17party as the governor and on the x-axis the percentage of members in the lower
house that are from the same party as the governor23. The upper right hand
corner are the observation in which the government is fully aligned, the governor
has a majority in both Houses. Our variable of interest, DivGovLIV, will be
zero in the upper hand corner and in the states without line item veto and 1
otherwise. In the model we haven’t dealt with two chambers for simplicity, the
implicit assumption here is that whenever the agenda is not fully controlled by
the governor’s party, we have ﬁnancial separation and taxes are low.
Another theoretical omission is the impact of override requirements once
the line item veto has been used. In the model we have assumed the veto
simply stuck. For 35 out of 47 states the override requires a two-third majority.
Another ﬁve states have an override requirement of one half of the votes in both
chambers24. We will place them together with the other 35 states. So we have
40 states with line item veto and seven with block veto25. In ﬁgure 2 we can
see diﬀerent areas according to political control in the states with line item veto
and a two-third override requirement. The variable DivGovLIV will be zero
in the upper right side square and 1 otherwise. The override requirement may
imply that the lower left hand side square may have a diﬀerent tax dynamic not
captured in our model. There, the opposing party has an override majority in
both chambers, so unless there are override costs the veto would play no role.
We abstain from this discussion here26 and classify those observations as a zero.
3.2 Fixed Eﬀects
To start with we assume strict exogeneity holds for all explanatory variables. We
are turning a blind eye to endogeneity problems and assuming that states fall
in and out of treatement randomly. Thus, we begin using standard ﬁxed eﬀects.
The ﬁxed eﬀect estimation is the closest to what the literature has done with line
item veto27. We do take into account that our outcome variable may be serially
correlated and always show robust and clustered standard errors. Bertrand,
Duﬂo and Mullainathan (2004) show that when the sample of states is large,
23Nebraska, the only unicameral state, is not included in the sample.
24Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee.
25Indiana, Maine, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, Rhode Island and Vermont.
26A possible way to identify this override eﬀect would be with regression discontinuity
design. Not enough data is available however.
27See Holtz-Eakins(1988)[12] and Besley and Case(2003)[7]
18ﬁfty or so, the use of clustered errors fairs well in face of serial correlation.
The estimating equation is given by
τst = ζs + δt + β0xst + λDivGovLIVst + εst,
where τst is the average tax rate (tax revenues over state income) for state
s at year t; ζs is a state ﬁxed eﬀect that allows us to control for time invari-
ant state characteristics that can be correlated with institutional variables; δt
is a year dummy; x is a vector of controls, including socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics, as well as other ﬁscal institutions; DivGovLIVst is our
explanatory variable of interest.
The results from the ﬁxed eﬀects strategy can be seen in the Table 1. The
47 states give us overtime 1834 observations. In all regressions we control for
state income and its square, state population and its square, proportion of aged
and proportion of kids. Robust and clustered standard errors are in parenthesis.
Our variable of interest, the interaction between a dummy for states with line
item veto a a dummy for divided government, is signiﬁcant to the inclusion of
further controls: a dummy for restrictive tax limitations, and dummies for the
party identity of the governor. All along we show clustered errors by state.
A concern is that we are not capturing the eﬀect of line item veto, but of
a divided government. To illustrate the point, in Table 2 we let a dummy for
divided government over all 47 states be our explanatory variable. As we can
see in column 1 and 2 it is signiﬁcant and has a negative sign. If however we
restrict our sample to the states without line item veto (column 3), the eﬀect
of a divided government looses its signiﬁcance. A divided government matters
when line item veto is available to the governor.
A ﬁxed-eﬀects strategy assumes that E(εst|zs) = 0, for all time periods
and all controls including state ﬁxed eﬀects (zs)—strict exogeneity assumption.
In particular, it implies that no omitted variable is correlated with explana-
tory variables of interest, and that there is no (signiﬁcant) reverse causality.
An example of reverse causality would be voters deciding to have a divided
government given that the tax level is high. This type of endogeneity may
be responsible for the positive correlation between the tax level and a divided
government in Holtz-Eakins(1988)[12]. An obvious omitted variable example is
voter preferences: if they change towards a lower tax rate in a particular state
politicians would respond accordingly and voters may ﬁnd it optimal to have
19a divided government. We would be overestimating the eﬀect of the a divided
government on the tax rate.
3.3 Instrumental Variables
We propose two instruments that are appropriate for our study: the fraction
of democrats in the lower oﬃces of a State, that is, not the House or Senate
and the a dummy for whether there were unopposed races in the State. Both
variables were gently provided by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002)[3]28. They
are partially correlated with our variable of interest: divided government as we
can see in column 1 of Table 3, the ﬁrst stage regression of our IV estimate.
And our identiﬁcation assumption is that the change in political power at the
lower levels of the state are not directly correlated with tax policy. As we can
see in columns 2 to 4, the eﬀect is still signiﬁcant, but smaller. This indicates
an upward bias in the simple ﬁxed eﬀect estimate. And the point estimate is
too sensitive on the choice for controls.
3.4 Discontinuity design
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a clear way to reduce the size of the
bias due to unobservables. This strategy consists in reducing the sample size to
those observations near the exogenous eligibility requirement for treatment. In
our context, the exogenous requirement is given by the simple majority align-
ment border of upper right hand side square in ﬁgure 2. Observations near these
lines are likely to have similar values for unobservables. It means that voters
preferences, for example, in a government holding 51% of the seats or 49% of
the seats are the same once we control for state and years ﬁxed eﬀects and other
observables. In practice we restrict the sample to the observations around the
border of the upper right had side square in ﬁgure 2, that is, all the observation
in which the governor’s party had from at least 47.5 to 52.5 percent in one of
the houses. We end up with 160 observations out of 32 states. On Table 4 we
see that the small number of observation takes its tow. The point estimation
is also higher than in the simple ﬁxed eﬀect but the standard errors are less
28In most states data for lower election results are available every second or third year. Not
to loose too many observations we have ﬁlled in the missing data in the years following a
result until the next result with the las election result.
20precise and depend a lot on the controls used. Mainly, the control for a dummy
for states with restrictive limits to taxation is mandatory for a signiﬁcant result.
3.5 Dynamic Panel
The next step is to allow for our outcome variable to be serially correlated.
Strict exogeneity rules out an important feedback eﬀect: variations in taxes in
t − j aﬀect voters’s decisions at time t, either changing the size of a governor’s
support in the legislature, or changing the party identity of a governor for a
given composition of the legislature. This a clear violation that can bias our
estimates systematically, and one major concern. More formally, our variable
of interest may be predetermined (weakly exogenous) since it can be correlated
with the error component in previous periods through the feedback:
DivGovLIVst = ξ0zst +
4 X
j=1
ρjτs,t−j + ψζs + vst. (1)
Both sources of biases can be addressed combining dynamic panels and in-
strumental variables estimates for our treatment variables. We use the standard
Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized Method of Moments estimator for the
dynamic speciﬁcation in (2). The approach requires us to specify the set of
strictly and weakly exogenous variables, remove ζs by ﬁrst diﬀerencing (2), and
deﬁne the set of instrumental variables. The equation to estimate is:
τst = ζs + δt + β0xst + λDivGovLIVst +
4 X
j=1
ρjτs,t−j + εst,. (2)






= 0, for j = 1,2,...,t − 1. These conditions open up a
variety of estimation procedures, with xt−1
s ≡ (xs1,xs2,...,xst−1) and its linear
combinations as potential instruments for ∆xst, for the equation in ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences.29 With other forms of endogeneneity, the set of potential instruments
made up of lags (and leads), varies according to the maintained assumptions.
Instruments not in the structural equation can be included as a source of ex-
ogenous variation. This is what we do in column 4; we add the share of votes
for democrat candidates in low oﬃce elections, such as, Attorney General. We
29As a practical matter, GMM estimators using many overidentifying restrictions are known
to have poor ﬁnite sample properties (see Wooldridge, pp. 305, 2002).
21follow Besley and Persson (2005)[5] and argue that this variable has no direct
eﬀect on local taxes but is correlated with the extent of political competition in
a given state.
In columns 1, 2 and 3 we treat all regressors but the lagged dependent
variables as strictly exogenous. In this version, we use the complete set of
available instruments under the maintained assumptions: for τst−j, we use
(τs1,...,τst−j−1) as instruments. We allow for four lags of our dependent vari-
able. In column 3 we test our predictions with a distributed lag model with one
lag in our variables of interest. Is a way to account for the two year interval of
parliamentary elections. In column 4 we also add the the outside instrumental
variable.
The results in Dynamic Table show that, on impact, the eﬀect of non-
separation of powers under alignment with line item veto negative an signiﬁcant.
These results are robust to diﬀerent sets of controls. The short-run eﬀect ranges
from 0.04 to 0.13 percentages of state taxes over state GDP. This implies that,
for an average state with 6% of taxes over state GDP, taxes increase up to
2.2% on impact when switching status from separation to alignment—once the
dynamic structure, other economic, political, demographic and time-invariant
unobserved characteristics have been controlled for. The dynamic speciﬁcation
allows us to compute the expected long-run eﬀect of non-separation of powers
due to party alignments. In steady state, the multiplier b m = 1
1−
P4
j=1 b ρj ranges
from 3.13 to 4. Under the maintained assumptions, the long run negative eﬀect
on the average tax rate ranges from .15 to .52 per cent of state GDP, and from
4 to 9 per cent of state taxes.
Our results are still preliminary, specially in the dynamic estimation. The
Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions are always very high. That is, the
null that all instruments used are exogenous is rejected. Being the number of
overidentifying restrictions too high, this is not surprising and requires revision.
Another issue is the autocorrelation of order two test, which is not always re-
jected at the 5 per cent. This can be an additional source of biases for our
estimates. We intend to continue of this work and have more robustness checks,
controlling for federal transfers and deﬁcit for example. Also adding another
outside instrument so that we can test them, a candidate is the share of women
in the houses. With two we can test overidentifying restrictions and it may
make sense to use the instruments also in the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. Overall
22once we start dealing with the endogeneity problems and the serial correlation
of our outcome variables the result that a divided government in states with
line item veto delivers a lower tax level is strong.
4 Concluding Remarks
With our model we have shown that ﬁnancial separation of powers is the in-
stitutional mechanism that delivers a low tax rate. In the American States it
is observed only when line item veto is present and the government is divided.
Empirically this is the ﬁrst work to tackle the endogeneity problems that arise
when trying to measure the eﬀect of line item veto interacted with a political
control variable such as divided government. Once we take care of these issues
the result is strong: when there is ﬁnancial separation of powers taxes are lower.
This should be valid to any work looking for constitutional eﬀects on the tax
level. Not all presidential regimes have ﬁnancial separation of powers, and we
only guess that maybe some parliamentary regimes do. How the executive is
elected or ousted is not relevant for tax rate comparison, what matters is who
is the residual claimant of a tax increase.
23Appendix
A.1 Simple Majority Override
The timing is identical to the case before. Here, however, L’proposal and its
vetoed version compete for a simple majority: two out of three legislators must
support it.
PROPOSITION 2: in equilibrium:
τ∗ = g∗ + r∗ + fL∗ ≤ 1;
fL∗ =
3 − g∗ − r∗
2
; fE = f3 = 0;
r∗ = rl + rL = 3 −
2δ
1 + δ/3






ωi = H(g∗), for i = E,3;
ωL = H(g∗) + fL∗;
and all politicians are re-elected.
Proof. First note that in the case L decides to forego reelection we have
the same result as before. L sets taxes to maximum and oﬀers any of the
other legislators r. Hence the voters face the same budget constraint as above:
3(τ − 1) + 2δW ≥ g + f.
When choosing their optimal reservation utilities, E voters face an additional
constraint: one of the other legislators must be at least indiﬀerent between the
vetoed version and the proposed version.
L’s voters also face an additional constraint: for them to be included in the
winning coalition with probability 1, L’s proposal should make them the least
expensive group.









2 ,fE = 0,r∗].
24Proof. Voters in group L choose g∗ optimally as before:
g∗ = min[H−1
g (1),3(1 − τ) + 2δW].
Their optimal choice of transfers is residually given by:
fL = 3 − g∗ − r∗ − f3,
condition on f3 ≥ fL, which implies:
fL∗ =




Note that the reservation utility of L voters is given by g∗, fL∗ and τ just
enough to pay for those and for r∗. The same is true for E.
LEMMA 2. τ ≤ 1.
Voters in E group will demand a reservation utility with τ just enough to pay
for g∗, fL∗ and r∗:
3τ = g∗ + 3 − 2δW + fL∗.
If g∗ = 3(1 − τ) + 2δW, τ = 1 and fL = 0. If g∗ < 3(1 − τ) + 2δW and fL∗ is
low enough, τ < 1
If voter in E ask for positive transfers in equilibrium the best response from
voters in L’s group still is to ask for f∗ and just enough taxes. At the veto
stage, E will face two proposals. Both deliver the same amount of transfers
fE = 0: one with low taxes (the veto) and one with τ = 1. E comes closer to
delivering his voters reservation utilities choosing low taxes. Whatever positive
transfers E voters ask, it is not a credible threat, L’s voters are still able to
achieve their optimal.QED.
In this case we also have W = 1
1+δ/3. Hence, we have the results in Propo-
sition 2. QED.
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TABLE 1 – Fixed Effects 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp 









stinc  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
stincsq 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
stpop  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
stpopsq 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
aged  4.22 4.94 4.82 6.26 
  (2.29)*  (2.28)** (2.27)** (2.50)** 
kids  7.87 7.22 7.17 8.04 
  (2.49)*** (2.45)*** (2.43)*** (3.00)*** 
supmaj    -0.34 -0.34 -0.29 
    (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** 
restrict    0.16 0.16 0.16 
    (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** 
demgov     -0.03  -0.03 
     (0.03)  (0.03) 
pbl    0.03 
     (0.01)*** 
grant     0.00 
     (0.00)*** 
State and 
Year effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1834 1834 1834 1646 
R-squared  0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 
Robust/Clustered by state standard errors  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp 









demgov   -0.02  0.06 -0.06 
    (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)* 
supmaj    -0.34 -0.02 -0.30 
   (0.06)***  (0.26)  (0.06)*** 
restrict    0.16 0.30 0.19 




YES YES YES YES 
State and 
Year effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Line Item 
Veto States 




YES YES YES  No 
Observations 1834  1834  297  1537 
R-squared  0.84 0.84 0.94 0.84 
Robust/Cluster by state standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
TABLE 3 – Instrumental Variable  
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
  DivGovLIV  ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp 
DemLowOff  -1.07     
  (0.19)***     
UnopposedRace  -0.11     
  (0.04)***     







restrict     0.19 0.19 
    (0.04)*** (0.04)*** 
supmaj     -0.32  -0.30 




Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Pbl and 
federal grant 
No  No No Yes 
State and 
Year effects 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Method  First  Stage  IV IV IV 
Observations  1679  1679 1679 1511 
R-squared  0.32  0.80 0.78 0.80 
Robust/Cluster by state Standard errors in parentheses for IV 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
TABLE 4  
Regression Discontinuity Design 
Sample restricted to Governor Support between 




 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp 







restrict    -0.51 
     (0.09)*** 




YES YES YES 
State and 
Year effects 
YES YES YES 
Observations 160  150  160 
R-squared 0.95  0.96  0.97 
Robust/Clustered by state standard errors  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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          (1) (2) (3) (4)
          ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp ttax_gdp
DivGovLIV  -.04        -.06 -.13 -.12








indgov          -.18 -.27 -.34






demgov          -.02 -.06 -.06






supmaj          -.20 -.28 -.25
   (.06)***  (.07)*** 
(.08)**  (.08)*** 
(.07)*** 
(.09)*** 
Restrict          .11 .13 .15
   (.03)***  (.03)*** 
(.04)  (.05)*** 
(.03)*** 
(.05)*** 
      
L1D          .65 .65 .61 .62






L2D        .02 .02 .03 -.04
          (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
L3D          .03 .03 .06 .05
          (.03) (.03) (.03)** (.03)
L4D          .07 .07 .10 .09






Controls    Yes Yes  Yes + lagged 
DivGovLIV 
Yes + lagged 
DivGovLIV s 
+IV 
Time dummies  Yes        Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs  1632  1632  1632  1632 
Number of groups  48  48  48  48 
Observations per group  34  34  34  34 










Sargan test  chi2(693) =   
844.20 
chi2(693) =   
832.65 
chi2(693) =   
919.06 
chi2(693) =   
950.12 
Wald chi2(42-44)  3169.70 
36452.74 
3238.05  Wald chi2(52)      
=   2773.82 
Wald chi2(53)     
=   2780.47 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. Group variable (i): state_code  One-step results. 
 